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Abstract. The growing diffusion of wireless devices is 
leading to an increasing demand for mobility and security. 
At the same time, most applications can only tolerate short 
breaks in the data flow, so that it is a challenge to find out 
mobility and authentication methods able to cope with these 
constraints. This paper aims to propose an authentication 
scheme which significantly shortens the authentication 
latency and that can be deployed in a variety of wireless 
environments ranging from common Wireless LANs 
(WLANs) to satellite-based access networks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Wireless LANs are widely used due to their easy
installation and fast deployment. Inside homes, hotels and
enterprises, WLANs are a cost effective alternative to 
traditional wired LANs. In public areas, shops and lounges, 
they are used by travelers and guests to get their e-mail, to
transfer data with the file servers of their company, or 
simply to surf the Internet looking for news. Usually these 
WLANs are connected to the Internet through ADSL 
broadband connections, but in some cases the WLAN uses a 
satellite link to connect a small group of residential and 
business users living in rural areas where ADSL can not be 
used, either for technical or economic reasons [1].
Thus, the applications of this technology can be extremely 
different, but they all share the same problems: limited 
bandwidth, weak security and lack of mobility.
The first issue has already been effectively addressed by
standardization bodies and industries, so that we are now 
able to share a bandwidth of at most 54 Mbps with a simple, 
low cost 802.11g wireless card. On the contrary, the two 
remaining issues require better solutions than those 
currently available [2][3][4]. In particular, the requirements 
of the applications we are used to run on our portable 
computers should be carefully taken into account in 
designing an integrated mobile secure wireless network. So 
far, however, the increase in security generally comes at the 
expenses of mobility: the time needed to authenticate 
increases the total handover time making impossible to 
support not only real-time applications, but even 
asynchronous ones.
This led us to study currently available authentication 
schemes to see whether it could be possible to overcome 
their present limits and make them usable in this new 
challenging unwired world. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we give a short overview of the main authentication 
mechanisms used in a wireless environment. Section 3
describes our authentication scheme and in Section 4 an 
example of its possible extension to a multi-domain 
environment is reported. Finally, in Section 5 we present our 
future work while  Section 6 summarizes the paper.
2 CURRENT AUTHENTICATION 
SCHEMES
Before starting the description of our proposal, it is 
worth recalling the brief story of the security in WLANs.
At the beginning, the only way to protect data from 
eavesdropping in a WLAN was to use WEP encryption [5]. 
This system was based on a secret key shared by the 
network client and the wireless Access Point (AP). Simple, 
difficult to manage (the key had to be manually written 
when configuring both the WLAN interface in the client 
computer and the AP) and unfortunately very weak (the 
interested reader can see [6]). Often, in order to improve its 
effectiveness, other mechanisms were used along with the 
WEP protocol. An example of this is the MAC address 
authentication where the MAC address of a station 
attempting to associate to an access point is compared 
against a list of authorized users stored in an external 
authentication server or even locally in the access point. The 
access is granted only if a matching entry is found. Actually, 
MAC address authentication does not improve the security 
of the WEP protocol since a valid MAC address can be 
easily spoofed and forged by any attacker.
The second act was the adoption of the 802.1X Network 
Access Control scheme [7], which was aimed to both 
wireless and wired LANs. Unfortunately, also this method 
proved to be not secure enough. This is basically due to fact 
that this scheme is still based on WEP keys. Furthermore, 
802.1X does not have a smart mechanism to manage keys.
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At this point, the industry was tired of waiting for a new 
standard able to overcome the shortcomings of WEP and 
802.1X, so that the Wi-Fi Alliance [8] along with members 
of the IEEE Task Group I, released the Wi-Fi Protected 
Access (WPA) method. This is a robust wireless LAN 
security solution that matched the immediate needs of the 
marketplace, and was readily adopted.
Finally, in June 2004, the IEEE approved the 802.11i 
standard [9], currently considered as the ultimate solution to 
wireless security. This standard, for the first time adopts a 
hierarchy of keys and new strong cryptographic algorithms.
Although security is certainly improved by the 802.11i, 
mobility is surely not: a full 802.11i authentication requires 
several messages most of which involving a (possibly) 
remotely located Authentication Server (AS), which usually 
adopts the de-facto standard RADIUS protocol. The result is 
a not negligible total handover time that makes this solution 
not suitable for mobility.
It is worth to notice that after this long authentication 
procedure the network client (or Mobile Host – MH – as it 
will be referred to in the following) and the AP, share a 
common key (the Pairwise Master Key – PMK) that in turns 
is used to locally generate the Pairwise Transient Key 
(PTK), which is the key actually used to encrypt data. This 
latter key is periodically regenerated so that it can not be 
successfully decoded intercepting enough data on the radio 
link (as it was possible with WEP and 802.1X). This 
periodical regeneration of the PTK just requires the 
exchange of four messages between the MH and the AP so 
that it can last a few milliseconds. We will refer to this 
simple procedure as Four Way Handshake (FWH).
Therefore, as far as the MH does not change the AP he is 
connected to, the short break due to the FWH required to 
regenerate the PTK does not affect any application, being it 
asynchronous or even real time.
One proposal trying to leverage on this nice property of 
802.11i was the Pro-Active Key Distribution (PAKD) 
scheme [10]. It tries to avoid long authentications by 
distributing the PMK to the neighbors of the AP the MH 
host is attached to before the MH handoff. In this way, when 
the MH connects to a new neighboring AP both of them
already share the PMK, so that the authentication procedure 
can be easier. To find out the neighbors of a given AP a data 
structure called Neighbor Graph is used.
Although the PAKD solution seems to effectively reduce 
the authentication latency, it unfortunately has two main 
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drawbacks: it lacks in security due to some modifications of
the 802.11i standard and it is intended to be a local solution 
only, that is it can not be used to authenticate users not 
registered in the local AS (we will refer to these users as 
foreigners from now on).
3 OUR AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
To try to solve the latency authentication problem we 
started from two considerations:
 a hierarchical structure could ease the key 
management;
 the PAKD mechanism requires a lot of key 
distributions when the lowest level of the hierarchy is 
the AP.
A simple solution is to split the AP in two different 
equipments, each implementing one of the two layer the AP 
is composed of, as suggested by the CAPWAP [11]
paradigm. According to this latter, the resulting 
infrastructure of a WLAN is composed of a number of 
Wireless Termination Points (WTPs) all controlled by a 
single Access Controller (AC). An example of such an 
architecture is shown in Figure 1
From the authentication point of view this implies that, 
after the authentication, a MH can freely handoff among all 
the WTPs laying under the same AC without needing 
further authentications. Another important point is that this 
architecture perfectly fits with the topology of the periphery 
of all enterprise networks: here each PC or AP is directly 
connected to a layer-2 switch, so that it would just be a 
matter of hours to replace APs with WTPs and layer-2 
switches with ACs.
Another advantage of this two-tier hierarchy is the 
possibility to identify three different types of mobility:
 Nano-mobility (n-mobility): when a MH moves between 
two WTPs controlled by the same AC;
 Micro-mobility (µ-mobility): when the MH moves 
between two WTPs controlled by two different ACs;
 Macro-mobility (M-mobility): when the MH leaves a 
WTP belonging to a domain and connects to another 
WTP of a different domain.
The original PAKD scheme roughly corresponds to a µ-
mobility handoff: M-mobility events are not taken into 
account.
In order to minimize the management overhead due to a 
PAKD mechanism, notice that these three events likely 
occur with different frequencies. So, it is worth to find out 
some way to treat them differently: in our scheme we 
propose three different authentication mechanisms, each of 
them being tailored on the actual security needs. The three 
abovementioned mobility events trigger a zero, fast or full 
authentication procedure, respectively.
In the following these three authentication procedures will 
be described in reverse order, starting from the most 
complex one to better show how our proposed modifications 
to the original protocol reduce its complexity and latency.
3.1 Full Authentication
In order to describe the full authentication process, we 
consider a MH and two domains, namely its Home Network 
(HN) and a Foreign Network (FN). Moreover, we assume 
that an agreement exist between these two domains, so that 
their authentication servers (ASs) can exchange messages 
on a secure link. At the beginning the MH is off line and is 
in a location within the FN.
When the MH switches on, and connects to the nearest WTP 
(in our example a WTP in the FN), it is asked to perform a 
full authentication, since it is unknown to the FN. During 
the full authentication the keys that will be used for other 
simpler authentication procedures (fast and zero 
authentication) are created and distributed.
To better understand this protocol first the authentication
and then the key management will be described. The first 
phase involves a MH, an authenticator (the AC) and a server 
(the AS). Its goal is to verify the MH credentials and to 
create the PMK to be shared between the MH and the AC. 
To start this procedure, the MH sends an EAPOL-Start
packet, according to the 802.1X standard. This is therefore a 
supplicant initiated authentication, whose basic message 
exchange is shown in Figure 2. It is easy to see, without 
going into many details, that the AC requests the MH 
identity (EAP Request-Identity) and upon receiving it (EAP 
Identity-Response) gets in touch with the local AS to verify 
the MH credentials.
If the MH is one of its registered users and the 
credentials are valid the key management procedure starts. 
Otherwise, as in this example, the local AS should get in 
touch with the AS of the domain where the MH is registered
(the AS in the HN in our case) to verify the MH credentials. 
Notice that the remote AS must be identified using the MH 
identity, which should therefore contain the HN domain 
name. A simple solution is to use the NAI [12] naming 
convention: <username>@<domain>. Obviously, all the 
AS names should have an identical host name (LocalAS for 
example) so that their full network name will be something 
like LocalAS.<domain>. A simple DNS query is therefore 
sufficient to get the remote AS IP address. Now a secure 
channel between the two ASes can be established, thanks to 
the previously mentioned agreement, so that the key 
generation and management can start and no information 
can be eavesdropped.
In the key management phase the FN AS just acts as a 
relay between the HN AS and the MH, and the procedure is 
fully in accordance with the 802.11i standard (see Figure 2
again).
At the end of this procedure the MH and the remote (i.e. in 
the HN) AS share a MK and the initial PMK, which is 
actually composed of the first 256 bits of the MK. Then, the 
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whole authentication context of the MH, that is the set of 
MK, initial PMK, MH identity and MH MAC address, is 
copied to the local AS (i.e. the one in the FN). Notice that 
the MH MAC address is required to compute the subsequent 
PMKs to be shared between MH and AC, according to the 
following formula, that was originally proposed in PAKD:
)__,( 1 MACMHMACACPMKMKPRFPMK nn =
where AC_MAC and MH_MAC are the AC and the MH 
MAC addresses, respectively, MK and PMK are the keys, 
and PRF is a pseudo random number generating function.
The simple protocol we have described solves the 
problem of the authentication across different domains by 
simply transferring an authentication context through a 
secure channel between two authentication servers. Notice 
that when the MH is in its HN the authentication context is 
still created but it is not sent anywhere.
In both cases, the first phase of the authentication
procedure ends when the local AS stores the authentication 
context and transmits the PMK to the AC. Also in this 
moment the location of the MH can be registered in both the 
local and the remote servers.
The second phase of the authentication aims to establish 
a shared PTK for the data traffic between the MH and the 
AC. The messages exchanged between the MH and the AC 
are those described in 802.11i with the only difference that 
in 802.11i the role of the authenticator is played by the 
Access Point (AP) whereas in our case the authenticator is 
the AC. This is the FWH and will described in the next
section along with the fast authentication procedure.
So far, full authentication is very similar to the 
authentication procedure described in 802.11i, being the 
only difference the interaction between the local AS and the 
remote one when the MH is roaming. From now on, 
however, our proposal adds new key management 
procedures to better support mobility.
EAP Response
TLS ClientHello(Random1)
EAP Response
TLS client_key_exchange
TLS Certificate
TLS certificate_verify
TLS change_cipher_suite
TLS finished
RADIUS Access Request
EAP Response
EAP Request
TLS ServerHello(Random2)
TLS Certificate
TLS Certificate Request
TLS server_key_exchange
TLS ServerDone
RADIUS Access Request
EAP Response TLS ClientHello
RADIUS Access Request/
EAP Response Identity
EAP Success,
RADIUS Accept
PMK
EAP Request Identity
EAP Response Identity (ID)
AP
AS
Master Key = TLS−PRF(PreMasterKey, "master secret" || random1 || random2)
EAP Request TLS
MH
RADIUS Access Challenge
EAP Request
RADIUS Access Challenge
EAP request
EAP Success
PMK = first 256 bits of MK
Figure 2 – Authentication phase in IEEE 802.11i
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The first addendum is based on the PAKD scheme and 
aims to the creation and distribution of the PMKs for the 
neighbors of the AC currently hosting the MH. In fact, 
whenever the AC changes the PMK should be updated by 
using the previously mentioned formula.
Note that the MH can compute the new PMK as soon as 
it obtains AC_MAC in response to the EAPOL-Start 
message (which is sent to a standard MAC address as 
specified in 802.1X), but the AC can not do that since it 
does not possess neither the PMK nor the MK. Since the 
MK, according to the 802.11i standard should never be 
moved to a peripheral device such as the AC, which is 
potentially less secure than a core device such as the AS, the 
only possible solution is to compute the PMKs in the AS. In 
fact, it knows all the required information, including the
MAC addresses of the ACs, and can therefore compute 
these keys and then copy them to every AC, along with the 
identity of the MH the PMK is related to.
This preliminary key distribution opens the way to a 
simpler authentication procedure when the MH moves from 
a WTP controlled by a given AC to another WTP controlled 
by a neighboring AC, i.e. an AC that already has the right 
PMK to re-authenticate this MH. We dubbed this new 
procedure Fast Authentication.
3.2 Fast Authentication
This procedure aims to authenticate a MH which is 
already known to the AC. Its message exchange is shown in
Figure 3. The procedure is activated by the reception at the 
AC of an implicit (i.e. a successful association) or explicit 
(i.e. an EAPOL-Start message sent by the MH) request of 
authentication. The AC verifies the possession of a PMK for 
the requesting MH: if a correct PMK is available, the four 
way handshake is started after having sent an EAP-Success
packet in response to the implicit or explicit authentication 
pending request; otherwise a full authentication is 
performed.
After the MH authentication, the FWH starts and the 
PTK is generated and installed. The message exchange in 
the FHW is shown in Figure 3, lower part. The procedure 
starts with the local generation of two random numbers, 
ANonce in the AC and SNonce in the MH. Then the AC 
sends ANonce to the MH, which computes the PTK using 
the formula
(
( )
( )
( ) ( ))SNonceANonceMaxSNonceANonceMin
MACMHMACACMax
MACMHMACACMin
PMKPRFPTK
,,
_,_
_,_
,"expansionkeyPairwise",=
Then, the MH sends back to the AC SNonce and the 
Message Integrity Code (MIC), i.e. a sort of digital 
signature computed using the Key Confirmation Key 
(KCK), which in turns is a portion of the PTK. At this point, 
also the AC can derive the PTK using the abovementioned
formula.
The two last messages are the confirmation of the 
successful generation of the PTK at the AC and the 
successful activation of the PTK in the MH.
Now the AC opens the controlled port and the MH can 
transmit and receive data traffic, which is encrypted for 
protection on the radio link.
Concurrently with the FWH, the new AC updates the 
MH location information stored in the local server. Notice 
that only this server should be updated since the server in 
the home network of the MH only records the foreign 
domain this user is authenticated with, and not the exact
Supplicant
(MH)
Authenticator
(AC)
PMK is known
Generate SNonce
Derive PTK
Derive PTK
EAPOL−Key(Install PTK, Unicast, MIC)
Install PTK Install PTK
802.1X Controlled Port
Unblocked
Generate ANonce
EAPOL−Key(ANonce, Unicast)
EAPOL−Key(SNonce, Unicast, MIC)
EAPOL−Key(Unicast, MIC)
PMK is known
EAPOL−Start
EAP−Success
Figure 3 – Fast Authentication with Four Way 
Handshake (FWH)
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location within that domain. Upon receiving a location 
update message from an AC, the AS generates the PMKs for 
the new neighboring ACs and sends them these keys.
It is straightforward to see that fast authentication is far 
shorter than full authentication, since it skips all the long 
lasting message exchange between the MH and the AS.
Moreover, in this procedure, some parts are concurrently 
executed to minimize the latency. In total, fast 
authentication lasts for only three RTT between MH and 
AC, and does not add any particular mechanism to the key 
management scheme of 802.11i. Finally, notice that the 
PTK update procedure, which requires the interaction 
between the AS and a group of ACs and thus can potentially 
last for a quite long time, is started after the MH has been 
re-authenticated and the data flow has been re-established.
This scheme is therefore particularly attractive when the 
RTT from MH to AS is high. As an example, the interested 
reader can refer to the network architecture proposed in the 
TWISTER project [1], where a mixed wireless and satellite 
network is being implemented to cover remote and 
underserviced areas in Europe. In that project mobility is not 
an issue, but one of the services to be tested is the wireless 
Internet access for tourists. Notice that in this system 
authentication is governed by a remotely located server and 
the RTT is in the order of some hundreds of milliseconds.
3.3 Zero Authentication
As already said, in an n-mobility event only the WTPs 
change, but the AC does not. This event is expected to take 
place more frequently than other mobility events, due to the 
topological characteristic of the networks we are 
considering.
Thus, the authentication mechanism should be handle it 
as fast as possible, trying to leverage on the possession of 
the same (and complete) set of keys by the AC and the MH. 
The solution we propose is based on a simple challenge 
started by the AC, as shown in Figure 4.
After a successful association to the new WTP, the MH 
sends an EAPOL-Start packet. Although the association to 
APs or WTPs is not specified as a trigger event for sending 
an EAPOL-Start packet, most of the supplicants have this 
feature implemented making this behavior a de facto
standard. As the AC receives such a packet it verifies, just 
looking at the sender MAC address, whether or not the MH 
has already been authenticated.
If the MH is unknown, the AC starts the full 
authentication procedure otherwise it must decide whether 
to carry out a Zero Authentication or a Fast Authentication: 
if no PTK is found for that MH, then the AC begins a Fast 
Authentication; if the AC already shares a PTK with the 
MH, then a n-mobility occurred and the Zero Authentication 
is initiated.
In the latter case a simple EAP-Success message could 
be sent, so that there is no further authentication for a MH 
involved in n-mobility and the data transmission can start 
immediately. Notice that this scheme is roughly equivalent 
to a MAC address based authentication: if the authenticator 
recognizes the MH MAC address as a valid (i.e. belonging 
to a pre-authenticated MH) address it opens the ports for 
data traffic. Therefore, the identity of the MH is confirmed 
by the use of the right PTK: if a rogue MH tries to enter the 
network using the MAC identity of an authenticated user it 
does not possess the right PTK, so that the AC can identify 
the threat and discard all the packets coming from the 
intruder.
This method loads the AC with the burden of controlling 
all incoming packets. Another simpler approach is the 
following: the AC replies to the EAPOL-Start message with 
Supplicant
(MH)
Authenticator
(AC)
802.1X Controlled Port
Unblocked
EAPOL−Start
PMK and PTK
are known
PMK and PTK
are known
EAP−Packet(Nonce, Counter, MIC)
EAP−Packet(Encrypted Nonce+1)
EAP−Success
Figure 4 – Zero Authentication message flow
Code Identifier Length
Type Type−Data
Counter Challenge MIC
(a) EAP Request Packet Format
Code Identifier Length
Type Type−Data
Encrypted Challenge+1
(b) EAP Response Packet Format
Figure 5 – Proposed EAP Packets format for Zero 
Authentication
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a challenge to immediately check the MH identity. In 
particular, we propose to create a new EAP packet type to 
perform this task. The format of the proposed EAP request 
and response packets is shown in Figure 5. It is worth to 
recall that response packets are always sent replying to 
request packets in the EAP protocol. As an example, in the 
message exchange of Figure 4, the second packet, sent by 
the AC to the MH, is of type request and the third one, sent 
as a reply from MH to AC, is of type response.
On the receipt of the EAPOL-Start message the 
authenticator sends to the MH an EAP Request packet 
containing a random generated number (nonce/challenge), a 
counter and the MIC. The counter is used to prevent 
possible reply attacks while the MIC, which is calculated 
using the KCK, guarantees the message integrity and, at the 
same time, confirms to the MH that the AC knows the PTK 
so that it can be trusted. The MH replies to the AC with the 
EAP-Response packet containing the random number+1 
encrypted with the KCK. The EAP-Success message is sent 
from the AC only after a successful response from the MH.
At this same time the AC opens the controlled port for 
this MH and from now on it does not check the correctness 
of the incoming packets. In terms of elapsed time, we can 
observe that our Zero Authentication scheme only requires 
two local (i.e. between the AC and the MH) RTT against the 
three of the Fast Authentication and the long message flow 
of the Full Authentication.
In order to improve key security, we maintain the re-
authentication mechanism described in the 802.11i standard. 
After a timeout set in the authenticator state machine a new 
PTK should be created. This is achieved by performing a 
four-way handshake initiated by the AC by means of an
EAPOL-Key packet.
4 ENHANCING MOBILITY BETWEEN 
DOMAINS
According to our proposed authentication method, a MH 
can easily move within a domain, but when it enters a new 
domain a Full Authentication should be carried out (recall 
that this is the mobility event referred to as M-mobility). In 
this last section we propose an enhancement that allows 
MHs to freely move among different domains without being 
forced to fully authenticate when an M-mobility event 
occurs.
The idea is to extend the Fast Authentication scheme to a 
multi-domain scenario. To do this, the main requirement is 
that both source and destination domains had previously 
agreed on a mutual trust relationship. We define as mutual 
trust relationship a particular agreement where the ASes of 
the involved parties can exchange the authentication 
information related to their MHs using a protected 
communication link. In this way, when a MH moves from 
his HN to a Foreign Network (FN) with whom such an 
agreement exists, its authentication context is transmitted to 
the FN AS by the HN AS so that the FN server can directly 
authenticate the MH using the Fast Authentication 
procedure. In the following of the paper we will refer to this 
network as a Trusted Foreign Network (TFN).
The MH authentication context is copied in the TFN 
server only when the MH reaches the boundary between its 
current network and the TFN, i.e. when it authenticates to an 
AC close to the TFN, i.e. to a Border Access Controller 
(BAC). Recalling the description of the Fast Authentication 
procedure, it can be noticed that the TFN is a “special 
neighbor” of the BAC, so that the authentication context 
transfer can be done along with the location update 
procedure started by the BAC. When the AS receives an 
update location request from a BAC, it reads from a list we 
call Trusted Foreign Network List (TFNL) the address of 
the AS in the TFN to be get in touch with, establishes a 
secure communication link and transfers the authentication 
context of the MH to the remote server. From now on, both 
the local and the remote ASes are informed of any update 
concerning the MH keys and location, so that a mirror copy 
of the authentication context of the MH is kept in the remote 
server until the MH is at the border of the two domains.
Obviously, if the MH moves away from the border the copy 
of his authentication context is deleted from the remote 
server.
This latter is therefore able to compute the correct PMK
and to distribute it to its ACs according to the rules of the 
PAKD scheme. Therefore, when the MH leaves its original 
network and moves towards the TFN, it will find an AC that
already has the correct PMK, so that a Fast Authentication 
can be done.
In its simplest form the trust is transitive: if a domain A 
has domain B in its TFNL and domain B has domain C in its 
TFNL, then domain A implicitly trusts domain C. This 
means than a MH moving from domain A to domain B can 
then move to domain C without being required to perform a 
Full Authentication. Another possibility is that any domain 
has its own TFNL, so that, referring to the previous 
example, domain C is not implicitly trusted by domain A. A 
Full Authentication is therefore required, unless domain C is 
in the TFNL of domain A. The server of domain B should 
check the trust relationship between A and C before 
transferring the authentication context of the MH to the 
server of domain C. The detailed protocol required to move 
the authentication context is currently under design in our 
lab.
Going back to the key management, when an AS 
receives the authentication context of a MH it can handle 
this roaming user as if it were one of its registered local 
users. In turns, the roaming MH can compute its PMK 
retrieving the MAC address of the AC it contacts in the new 
domain (this MAC address can be found in the response to 
the EAPOL-Start message sent by the MH) and can carry 
out a Fast Authentication.
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5 FUTURE WORK
At the time of this writing, there are no performance 
results available for the solution proposed throughout this 
paper, since our project is still in its definition phase. 
However, a group of researchers and students of Politecnico 
di Torino has recently started working on an experimental
test bed. The first goal is to implement the four way 
handshake mechanism. For this to be achieved, some 
modifications to the FreeRADIUS [13] and hostap [14] code
will be necessary, since there are no implementation of the 
802.11i standard freely available. This step achieved, the 
three authentication methods (i.e. Full Authentication, Fast 
Authentication and Zero Authentication) will be fully 
implemented and tested. If the empirical results obtained by 
these tests confirm low authentication latencies, further 
studies will focus on the multi-domain extension of the Fast 
Authentication mechanism.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a possible solution aiming to reduce 
the latency introduced by current authentication schemes.
The Fast Authentication procedure leverages on the 
distribution of the authentication key before a Mobile Host 
reaches a new Access Controller. This idea comes from the 
proposal dubbed Pro-Active Key Distribution. With respect 
to this latter, our solution overcomes all the problems 
affecting this mechanism. Along with an even faster 
authentication scheme dubbed Zero Authentication, our 
proposal provides a novel method for a complete, scalable, 
secure and fast authentication of mobile users within a 
single domain. Finally, we showed that with some not very 
complex mutual trusts this method can also be applied to a 
multi-domain network.
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